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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Adequacy of Service of Process: Is service of process 
by publication adequate where the party seeking service of 
process knows the correct address of the opposing party but no 
copy of the summons or complaint are mailed to that address? 
Standard of Appellate Review; This issue is a matter of 
law, and the Court of Appeals should review for correctness 
the legal conclusions of the District Court.1 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: This issue was 
presented to the District Court in Appellant's Memorandum 
and Reply Memorandum in support of Appellant's Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment and Decree Quieting Title. 
2. Setting Aside Default Judgment; Should a default 
judgment be set aside where (a) the defendant did not receive 
actual notice of the action until after the default judgment was 
enteredf (b) service of process was given by publication and by 
mailing to an inadequate address, and (c) although the attorney 
seeking to serve process knew of the defendant's correct address, 
no notice was mailed there? 
1
 Graham v. Sawava. 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981.) 
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Standard of Appellate Review: The District Court's 
decision on this issue should not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion.2 
Preservation of Issue in District Court; This issue was 
presented to the District Court in Appellant's Memorandum 
and Reply Memorandum in support of Appellant's Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment and Decree Quieting Title. 
APPLICABLE RULES 
The following rules are relevant in deciding this case: Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), 4(g), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(3), 
60(b)(4), 60 (b)(5) and 60(b)(7)3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case and Disposition in District Court 
This action was brought by Respondents ("Plaintiffs" or 
"Wardles") to quiet title to certain real property in Davis 
County, Utah. After unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons 
and complaint on Appellant ("Defendant" or "Romero") personally, 
Plaintiffs sought and obtained an order allowing service by 
publication and by mailing to Defendant's last known address. 
Plaintiffs misstated Defendant's last known address, however, so 
that the summons and complaint were mailed to an inaccurate 
address and Defendant did not receive actual notice of the 
action. When Defendant failed to answer the complaint, a default 
judgment was entered. Upon learning of the judgment, Defendant 
2
 Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989.) 
3
 The relevant rules are quoted in full in Addendum 1. 
-5-
filed a timely motion to set it aside. This is an appeal from 
the District Court's denial of Defendant's motion to set aside 
the default judgment. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. On March 1, 1960, Defendant Lester Romero sold a parcel 
of real property (the "Property") located in Davis County to the 
Plaintiffs. He received a promissory note for $6,000, secured by 
a deed of trust on the Property. He also received a signed 
quitclaim deed conveying the Property back to him, which he could 
record if Plaintiffs did not pay as promised. 
2. During the next 33 years Plaintiffs were rarely prompt 
in paying their obligations as required by the promissory note. 
Consequently, Mr. Romero was forced to constantly work with them 
to receive the required payment. He never allowed more than 
three (3) years to elapse without collecting a payment. 
3. Although Plaintiffs paid the property taxes as required 
by the deed of trust and made occasional payments to Mr. Romero, 
the promissory note remained constantly delinquent. For the past 
several years, Plaintiffs have disputed the amount due on the 
promissory note. 
4. On May 24, 1993, Mr. Romero, being unable to convince 
Plaintiffs of their remaining obligation, recorded the quitclaim 
deed. 
5. On or about November 18, 1993, Plaintiffs' attorney, 
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George K. Fadel, mailed a letter to Mr. Romero.4 The letter 
was addressed to Mr. Romero at two locations: his residence at 
6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084, and a "General 
Delivery" address which is the address for the United States Post 
Office in Salt Lake City. The letter requested that Mr. Romero 
deed the Property back to Plaintiffs. Mr. Romero received the 
copy addressed to his residence and responded in writing, 
suggesting that Mr. Fadel speak with his clients to get all the 
facts so they could settle the matter. Mr. Romero heard nothing 
further from either the Plaintiffs or their attorney until after 
the default judgment had been entered in this case. 
6. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action in 
January, 1994. Mr. Fadel attempted to obtain personal service on 
Mr. Romero at his residence at 6270 South Margray Drive. A 
sheriff's deputy made numerous attempts between January 13, 1994 
and March 11, 1994, but he was not successful in obtaining 
personal service. 
7. On June 14, 1994, Mr. Fadel prepared and filed with the 
District Court a Motion and Order allowing Service of Process by 
Publication. The Order required service to be made by 
publication of summons and "by mailing to the defendant a copy of 
Summons and Complaint at his last known address: 1760 West 2100 
South. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111" (emphasis added.) This 
address was not Mr. Romero's last known address, nor was it the 
4
 A full copy of the letter is attached to the Affidavit of 
Lester Romero contained in Addendum 2. 
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address where the deputy had attempted personal service. 
Instead, it is the address of the main United States Post Office 
for Salt Lake City. The District Court signed and entered the 
order which Mr. Fadel had prepared. 
8. Acting pursuant to the Order, Mr. Fadel caused a summons 
to be published, and attempted twice to mail copies of the 
summons and complaint to Mr. Romero at 1760 West 2100 South. 
Both mailings were returned to Mr. Fadel unclaimed. 
9. Based on Mr. Romero's failure to appear, a default 
judgment was entered on June 16, 1994. 
10. In July 1994, Mr. Romero made a trip to the Davis 
County Courthouse to determine what, if anything he needed to do 
further since filing his quitclaim deed. To his surprise, he 
discovered the default judgment quieting title to the Property in 
the Plaintiffs. On September 7, 1994, less than 3 months after 
the entry of the default judgment, Mr. Romero filed a Motion to 
set aside the judgment and decree quieting title in the 
Plaintiffs, claiming that he had not been properly served 
according to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) 4(e) and citing 
URCP 60(b) as grounds for setting aside the default judgment. 
11. Without a hearing, the District Court judge denied 
Defendants Motion, ruling that the attempted personal service by 
the sheriff and the publication in the Davis County Clipper for 
three (3) weeks was reasonably calculated to apprise the 
defendant of the action as required by URCP 4(e) and 4(g). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS NOT ADEQUATE. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 
(1950) requires that any means other than personal service used 
to effect service of process must not be substantially less 
likely to give actual notice than other feasible substitutes. 
Where a defendant's actual address is known, it is incumbent on 
the plaintiff to give notice at that address. 
In Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who relies on alternate means 
of service of process must meet two diligence requirements. 
First, the plaintiff must show diligence in determining that 
personal service cannot be obtained and service by alternate 
means is appropriate. Second, the plaintiff must use diligence 
in using the alternate means of service in order to give actual 
notice to the defendant. 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of 
Mullane, because Plaintiffs mailed the summons and complaint in 
this action to an address where Defendant was unlikely to receive 
it, instead of mailing to Defendant's correct address which was 
known to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the 
requirements of Carlson by failing to exercise diligence in 
implementing the alternate means of service allowed by the 
District Court. 
The Utah cases of Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 
1988); Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979); and Weber v. 
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Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah App. 1990) all involve facts 
similar to the present case. In each of these cases, the court 
required greater diligence in effecting service of process than 
was exercised by Plaintiffs in this case. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION UNDER RULE 60(b). 
Assuming, arguendo. that service of process was adequate, 
the District Court should nevertheless have set aside the default 
judgment under URCP 60(b). Defendant is entitled to relief (a) 
under subpart (1) of the Rule, due to surprise; (b) under subpart 
(3), due to the fact that Plaintiffs misrepresented Defendants 
address to the District Court; (c) under subpart (4), since 
process was not personally served in this case; and (d) under 
subpart (7), because in spite of Defendant's diligence, default 
judgment was entered through circumstances beyond Defendant's 
control. 
In Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where a defendant (1) has not been served 
personally, (2) has no actual notice of pendency of the action in 
time to present his defense, (3) is injuriously affected by the 
judgment, and (4) has tendered an issue on the merits, he has an 
absolute right to have the judgment set aside. Defendant meets 
all of these criteria. 
Defendant's Motion to set aside this default judgment was 
filed within three months after the entry of the judgment and was 
therefore timely. 
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Defendant has a meritorious defense which he should be 
permitted to present in court. If Defendant establishes the 
allegations contained in his affidavit, Defendant will be 
entitled to a ruling that there are still sums owed to him and 
that he has a valid lien against the Property securing those 
sums. 
In the alternative, this case should be remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to consider Defendant's grounds 
for relief under URCP 60(b). While the District Court addressed 
sufficiency of service of process, it failed to recognize that 
even if Defendant was legally served with process, URCP 60(b) may 
require setting aside the default judgment and addressing this 
case on its merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS 
WAS SUFFICIENT UNDER URCP 4(e) AND 4(g). 
Rule 4(e)(1) of the URCP states that personal service on an 
individual must be made by delivering a copy of the summons and 
complaint to the individual personally or by leaving it at the 
individual's residence with someone of suitable age and 
discretion. Mr. Romero lives alone. Personal service was 
attempted unsuccessfully at his residence at 6270 Margray Drive, 
West Jordan, UT 84084. When Plaintiffs were unable to obtain 
personal service on Defendant, they resorted to alternative 
service pursuant to Rule 4(g) of the URCP. 
-11-
If a party to be served cannot be identified, located or 
served, Rule 4(g) of the URCP allows service of process "by 
publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, 
or by some combination of the above, provided that the means of 
notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency 
of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. 
The constitutional requirements relating to service of 
process were explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), as follows: 
[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is 
a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed 
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The 
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of 
any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it 
is in itself reasonably certain to inform those 
affected... or, where conditions do not reasonably 
permit such notice, that the form chosen is not 
substantially less likely to bring home notice than 
other of the feasible and customary substitutes. 339 
U.S. at 315. (Citations omitted.) 
Mullane involved notice of a final accounting and 
termination of a trust. A New York statute allowed the trustee 
of the trust to notify all beneficiaries by simply publishing 
notice in a local newspaper. The Supreme Court used a balancing 
approach to analyze the validity of the New York statute, 
balancing the rights of the trust beneficiaries against the 
interests of the state in effecting a final settlement of the 
trust. The court reasoned that it would not be practicable to 
require personal notice to every beneficiary (some of whom may 
not be locatable), nor would it be equitable to allow notice by 
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publication only to beneficiaries who could easily be located and 
who could be informed by surer means. The court concluded that 
different forms of notice would be permissible for different 
classes of beneficiaries. Referring particularly to 
beneficiaries with known addresses, the court stated: 
As to known present beneficiaries of known place 
of residence, however, notice by publication stands on 
a different footing.... Where the names and post 
office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are 
at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less 
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency. 
The trustee has on its books the names and 
addresses of the income beneficiaries represented by 
appellant, and we find no tenable ground for dispensing 
with a serious effort to inform them personally of the 
accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record 
addresses. 339 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added.) 
In Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court applied the Mullane principles and established 
important Utah guidelines governing alternative means of service 
of process. Carlson involved service of process on a non-
resident motorist. The plaintiff had given notice by mail to a 
two and one-half year old address. No effort was made to 
determine the defendant's current address. The court considered 
the competing interests of the parties. First and foremost among 
those was the defendant's right to be informed of pending legal 
action and to be provided with an opportunity to defend. Id. at 
1271. This was balanced against the practical obstacles facing 
the notice giver such as cost and time involved. .Id. at 1273. 
In Carlson the plaintiff only needed to locate one person. 
The court conceded that some money and time may be lost in 
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locating the person, but cone] udej • . .. i . - >a^a :• jt. __ 
(Cf I lullai le N he i: e / 
beneficiary of the trust would cause great hardship :n tho 
trust.) 
a n a V J .. < t 
plaintiff with respect f service oi |.:o-,> First, the court 
stated that he*- r j *'es<~*rting * •* service --v m^; ' *-^ nlaintiff 
must - i. 
'.ermined that the defendant is not resident in \ - t- r- at*? ^ f 
Utah , =»* ""• " F^'^r j • -1*3* t-^  satisfy 
a diligent attempt tc , i a.ir. the defendant s current address. 
"If a current address i ^  ^isrover^ * ha» p,-'inr^ s? - tne one tw 
whic c _ 
An analysis o* the tacts or the present case snow, ^ho4" ^hr-
plaintiffs have *-~* natxsfioc4 the rp<"»*-i *-^mery^-s Gf either Mullane 
- a n s o n rainti 
current address * v had previously corresponded with a.iter: 
a t that address, and they arranged for the c:i e pi lty to attempt 
p e r s o n a ^ service . . tddxess • 1EI] • \ i t tern; til i i g t: :: • fc .a u e 
defendant personally served, defendants satisfied the first 
diligence requirement i mposed by Carlson: •- showed that an 
1.1 1 I e i iiiiiii i f" in ill ::: i : s e r I«I :i c a • ; s as \\\\\i\ opj ,..;•. i-tely 
failed, however, to satisfy the second dil.Laence requirement 
imposed by Carlson, Instead of miinq t he correct; address for the 
uernati v e service ., the^ used an addLeii «n win 11 li was easily 
• - 1 4 -
identifiable as the main post office for Salt Lake City. In 
doing so, they selected a method of notice which was much less 
likely to apprise defendant of this lawsuit than other means 
which were readily available. 
The District Court considered the mailing, publication, and 
personal service attempts together, and concluded that the 
plaintiffs had made a diligent effort. But this analysis ignores 
the fact that Carlson requires two diligent efforts. After using 
diligence to show that alternative service is appropriate, a 
plaintiff must then use diligence in implementing the alternative 
service so that the notice is reasonably calculated to reach the 
defendant. 
This default judgment must be set aside based on similar 
facts in other cases. In the case of Guenther v. Guenther, 749 
P.2d 628 (Utah 1988), the sheriff tried to personally serve the 
defendant but was unsuccessful. However, the plaintiff knew the 
defendant's last known address and mailed a notice to that 
address. The defendant received that notice and service was held 
to be adequate. 
If, as in Guenther, Plaintiffs had sent the notice to 6270 
Margray Dr. which was Mr. Romero's correct last known address, 
then he would have received it and a default judgment would not 
have been entered. 
In Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979), plaintiff's 
counsel mailed a withdrawal of counsel notice to defendant's last 
known address, to defendant's wife's last known address, and upon 
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ning °f defendant 's niru-nt address • ended 
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whether Plaintiffs > e.*m-.' scertain ••-
address was recorded. ... t-vem., uie> h a d Defendant. .. .. ».-~L 
last '" address and • - • ' otice defendant at 
j. Weber v. Snvderville West, «..v. • -id .6 (Utah App. LJi 
plaintiff's attorney searched *-»- a correct address in telephone 
I ill Hill ( 
California, ^ne County Recorders files i" Sunuiu ~ .:.M ,i«.t I tin 
Counties, and ^  ^ostal records (the correct address was on the 
i. 
which the pla int i f f had access t o ) . tve" having sectioned a l l 
those records, t h i s Court h«' ! »Mt 'he nLan^i f t '*-..' access to 
I I i I i I 
been done, Weber(plaintJ mio readily have oeen able to 
personally serve defendant -i at 
error in Weber v. Snvderville West. iaintiffs kne* Mi. 
Romero ^ -orrect last knowr r -r. * ' i not mail a copy of 
i i mi i e e l I In If i in mi i t ' mi i ) 
l^d have received the notice and a uefault judgment would not 
ve been entered against *^„. 
If, as Defendant maintains, there was inadequate service of 
process, the default judgment entered by the District Court is 
void. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S URCP MOTIONS FOR RELIEF. 
A District Court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a 
motion for relief from judgment under URCP 60(b)and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 
1989); Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). However, the 
District Court "should be generally indulgent toward permitting 
full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled 
advisedly and in conformity with law and justice." Mavhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 1962). "Courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments 
where there is any reasonable excuse . . . ." Westinghouse Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975). In fact, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendants failure to 
appear and timely made application is made to set it aside." 
Mayhew, at 952, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant realizes that the burden of showing that the 
District Court abused its discretion lies with him. The Utah 
Supreme Court laid out three criteria that a movant must meet to 
overcome the abuse of discretion standard and have a default 
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judgment -** >M " movant * et f^r^H
 a UFCP 60 r, 
acti 
was -ic 'OT.VJW laat he lias a meritorious deiense tu the 
actior tate By & .Through. Dept. of Soc. Services v. Musselman, 
667 
Defendant has set forth a URCP 60fb) action for relief. 
i -pep eoibix] 
K U l ^ H I I ' A J I I i l l II I II II ( . ' I 
judgment may be granted f^r mistake, . nntlveitence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, ueiendant claims that he was surprised by the 
defau- lagment. 
In May 1993, Mr. Romero fi 1 ed the quitclaim deed he received 
as security from the Pla:ntiffr '-vprnb^r of +-hat same year, 
he received a 3 • E-sLlei . . Mi I I 
had been retained to < p the dispute betweer * Romero nnrt 
the PlaintiffP M* • r^~~ -^rr^ndec1 w" n 1 ^ tter and gave the 
attorney information .... > „ . ,..„ . .... _t le in ill "i • 
Mr. ij stated in t ;.e letter (which JS I; Addendum J) l.hat 1 ' 
felt the Plaintiff r were mirleadina their n+'tr^nev and now that 
the attorney would iav<=> ai „
 t..j.^: 4 L:/. ^maLi. i Il Mil 
tell his clients that * u -v ,;ere :n error and still owed money on 
the promissory note, * * * ^isp^+r Ft4 IT ev-:«*ted after the • 
attorney spoke with his __: . * . i^ -
someone. 
Mr. Romerc ~ - nythin~ ^:rtber either r^oir 
Plaintiffs ) N ,.I, L ,.jrnuiy 
- il nil 
to the Davis County Courthouse to determine what, if any further 
action he needed to take in regards to the previously recorded 
quitclaim deed. He was surprised to learn of a default judgment 
entered against him. 
Mr. Romero, by his return letter, had put the onus on 
Plaintiffs' attorney to contact him again concerning this matter 
and Mr. Romero fully expected that he would be contacted as 
evidenced by his letter stating that he desired to settle this 
case with the Plaintiffs for what they owed. 
From November to July, Mr. Romero was not contacted and 
notice was not given to him about the pending matter. Thus he 
was justifiably surprised to discover the default judgment. It 
should, therefore, be set aside according to URCP 60(b)(1) 
2. URCP 60(b)(3) 
Defendants second URCP 60(b) action for relief is governed 
by URCP 60(b)(3) which states that relief can be granted for 
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the adverse party. 
Mr. Romero states that Plaintiffs' attorney misrepresented 
to the court his last known address. 
Mr. Fadel knew that Mr. Romero could be reached at 6270 
Margray Dr. He had previously corresponded with Mr. Romero at 
that address and had instructed the deputy to serve Mr. Romero at 
that address. Yet he represented to the District Court, in his 
motion asking it to grant service by publication and mail, that 
Mr. Romero's last known address was General Delivery, 1760 West 
2100 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. (See paragraph 10 of the 
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D i s t r i c t Court ' s Ruling Appendix rough miru 
d 
last known address was 6270 Margray Dr. 
Because Mr. Romero's correct last know n address i;i .; as 
misj * ' . t: C :: HI :i r t , I I " i *• : mer< • ::i! i * 
notice o: the pending action. The default judgme;^ should 
therefore be set aside under URCP 6G^b/x~;. 
Defendant alsc Lr*^  vaJid claim for relief —~i«r "rf0 
60(b) (4 hjc nrovi « i ^»n a ^ < >ws relief fro* Hqinent "when- for 
6 
servec ;. the defendant at . irea ny Ruie *
 s *-- -ad the 
defendant has failed * tope** • *.;i : otion 
L 
law, that defendants ..«•-• * . > -*u served personally should 
have ^ '"irr-ite^  nerioH ^f time dt,rino which, ^ a matter of r • 
t .adgiueii 
complaint on xi s merits "ect-^n 104-14-4 t oae 
Annotated p TOV5**- ^ --'•*: 
When, iruin any cause, the auuuaons in ai. aunuii uc? . . 
been personally served on the defendant or his legal 
representative, the court may allow, on such terms as 
may be just, such defendant or his legal 
representative, at any time within ninety days after 
the entry of any judgment in such action, to answer to 
"...-
:
- the merits of-the original action 
5
 Section 1293, Compiled Laws of Ut ah o E 1876, allowed a 
defendant who had not been personal! y served a period of six 
months after the judgment to have the judgment set asi de and 
answer the merits of the complaint. 
Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930) is a case 
decided under section 104-14-4 which is quite similar to the 
present case* Naisbitt was a quiet title action. The defendant 
was served only by publication. Within a year after the final 
decree was entered, the defendant, who had not received actual 
notice of the lawsuit until after the decree, moved to have the 
judgment set aside. His motion was denied by the District Court. 
The Supreme Court reversed, stating as follows: 
In proceedings to open default judgments, the 
courts quite generally distinguish between those 
judgments where personal service of summons has been 
had or personal appearance has been made before 
judgment and those judgments where there has been 
merely constructive service of process.... 
The law applicable to... [judgments founded upon 
constructive service of process] is stated in 1 Freeman 
on Judgments (5th Ed.) p. 451, §229. It is there said, 
in referring to statutes allowing judgments based on 
constructive service of process to be vacated, that "on 
complying with the conditions of the statute, the 
moving party acquires an absolute right to have the 
judgment opened, which the court has no discretion to 
deny." Numerous cases cited in support of the text 
will be found collected in a footnote. The rule of law 
deducible from the adjudicated cases there cited is 
this: If a moving party shows (1) that he has not been 
personally served with process, (2) that he had had no 
actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to 
appear and make his defense, (3) that he is injuriously 
affected by the judgment, and (4) that he has tendered 
an issue to the merits of the claim of his adversary, 
then and in such case he has an absolute right to have 
the judgment opened. 290 P. at 953. 
Defendant acknowledges that section 104-14-4 has been superseded 
by Rule 60(b). The wording of the Rule is so close to the 
wording of the former statute, however, that Naisbitt remains 
good precedent. 
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4 URCP 60(b)11) 
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• - . . ' • • '• ' • v - • - 2 2 
Defendant has shown a reason justifying relief according to 
URCP 60(b)(7) and the default judgment should be set aside. 
B. Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment 
must be timely made. 
According to Rule 60(b)f a motion is timely under subparts 
(b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(4) when it is filed within three (3) 
months of receiving notice of the default judgment. However, the 
time period for 60 (b)(7) is a reasonable time after receiving 
notice. Defendant has clearly filed both within the three month 
period and within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the 
default judgment. The default judgment was entered on June 16, 
1994. Mr. Romero learned of it on July 20, 1994. On September 
7, 1994, Mr. Romero filed his motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
C. Defendant has a meritorious defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State By & Through Dept. of Soc. 
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), defined what it 
meant by a meritorious defense. The Court stated that it was 
"one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts 
which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgement different 
from the one entered." .Id. at 1057. 
In Mr. Romero,s memorandum in support of the motion to set 
aside the default judgment, he refers to the accompanying 
affidavit which states specific and sufficiently detailed facts 
that would result in a different judgment if they are proven. 
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Because Defendant has m~+ ^ M t >^ep requirements of 
Mussej-inai 
so thi5r. 1.»;e case may proceed i^\ its merits. 
D. Alternative grounds for setting aside the default 
judgment. 
In the alternative, Defendant requests that this case be 
remanded to the Hi strict Court for f^rt^r findings if fact and 
Il II Il ' U c i i u t j I I n III mi s i ' i r i 
not addres s Mr. Romero ' s LIRCP 6tl|b)i g r o u n d s i o r r e i x e f . 
A r e v i e w of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g (Addendum shows 
t h a t t h e m IIIIIMJ. i'il I In in I I IIIIUMIH \ c Il \ rv hlv 
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but failed to recognize that even if service of process is 
legally sufficient there may be equitable grounds to set aside 
the default judgment and address the case on its merits. Rule 
60(b) is intended to be used "in the furtherance of justice" to 
relieve a party from a final judgment in the circumstances 
described in the Rule. There is no discussion in the District 
Court's ruling of whether or not this case meets the criteria for 
relief under Rule 60(b). In fact, there is no mention whatever 
of Rule 60(b) in the court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Through no fault of his own Mr. Romero never received 
service of process. Service was not adequate under URCP 4(g) nor 
under Mullane and Carlson. The District Court abused its 
discretion when it found service to be "reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise the defendant of the 
pendency of the action." Even if the service was adequate, it 
was not personal service and Mr. Romero should be relieved from 
the effects of the default judgment under Rule 60(b). For these 
reasons Defendant requests this court to set aside the default 
judgment. 
DATED this ^0 day of March, 1995. 






CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the Zo day of March, 1995, I caused two 
copies of the foregoing pleading to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
<^4~c^C UA^MAJ^ 
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ADDENDUM 1: RULES 
Rule 60(b) Mistakes; inadvertence: excusable neglect: newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action 
has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgement has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1) , (2), (3), or (4 ), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
4(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
1. Upon any individual other than one covered by 
subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) belowf by delivering a copy of the 
summons and/or the complaint to the individual personally, or by 
leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
4(g) Other service. 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served 
are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable 
under the circumstances, or where there exists good cause or 
believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of 
process, the party seeking service of process may file a motion 
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by 
publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting 
affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or 
serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. If the 
motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by 
publication by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or 
by some combination of the above, provided that the means of notice 
employed shall be reasonably calculated under all the 
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of 
the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The 
court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be 
served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the 
defendant with the process specified by the court. 
ADDENDUM 2: PLEADINGS 
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| MOTION FOR SERVICE 
OF PROCESS BY PUBLICATION AND 
ORDER 
| Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
On January 3, 1994, George K. Fadel, attorney for 
plaintiffs, deposited a Summons and Complaint with the Civil 
Process Division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office to be 
served upon Lester Romero, defendant. Having expended 
significant effort, the Salt Lake County Sheriff has been unable 
to serve process upon Romero. Since January 13, 1994, Officer 
Jack Hill of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department has 
attempted to serve Romero at his residence twenty-three times. 
Officer Hill has had prior dealings with Romero and believes that 
Romero recognizes Officer Hill and is intentionally avoiding 
service of process. Officer Hill believes that Romero has been 
home but has refused to answer his door. Additionally, Officer 
Hill has sent Officer Ron Jensen to attempt service of process. 
1 
LB « 
Officer Jensen's efforts were equally unproductive. 
Having exhausted other service of process methods, 
plaintiffs pray for an order authorizing service of process upon 
defendant, Romero, by publication in the Davis County Clipper, a 
newspaper of general circulation in Davis County, Utah. 
^eorge K2 Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this /A day of April, 
tte4ary Public r^LL.f?SM/-\.ALr<^ %'\J\ 
Residing at Bountifui^XJtah •^ > '•$,£ 
i to •. (y>f~ ^ : o £ 
My Conunxssion expires: *•?•'• •*!, l±:2 
v *• 'V / ^  / 
\ •• • \<S^ 
lfW 10\^> 
ORDER 
Upon reading the foregoing motion and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that service of process upon 
Lester Romero be made by publication of summons in the Davis 
County Clipper, Bountiful, Utah, at least once a week for four 
successive weeks, and by mailing to the defendant a copy of 
Summons and Complaint at his last known address: 1760 West 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Dated this \2J^ day of April, 1994. 
By the Court: 
Distric 
2 
J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020) 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290 
Telephone: (801) 363-2262 
L&A Case No. X0045 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






THORA MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE IN 
PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant, through his counsel, submits the following 
memorandum in support of his Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs (the "Motion"). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Plaintiffs commenced this action in January, 1994 and 
issued a summons for service on January 3, 1994. (Record.) 
2. Defendant claims a security interest in the property 
subject of this action (the "Property"). (Affidavit of Lester 
Romero (hereinafter the "Affidavit"), Mf 4-11.) 
3. Plaintiffs' counsel made application to the Court for an 
order authorizing alternative service by publication. (Record.) 
i 
4. In that application, plaintiffs' counsel represented that 
23 unsuccessful attempts had been made to serve defendant. 
(Record.) 
5. From the court's file (specifically language in the order 
authorizing alternative service which states that the last known 
address of the defendant is 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84111), it appears that plaintiffs' counsel's representations 
concerning the attempted service were either false or that those 
attempts were made at the U.S. Post Office which is located at that 
address• (Record.) 
6. Defendant resides at 6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 
84084. (Affidavit, H14). 
7. Plaintiffs' counsel was aware of the defendant's address 
at his residence. (Affidavit, HH13-15.) 
8. Defendant had no knowledge of this action until July 21, 
1994. (Affidavit, H19.) 
9. Plaintiffs did not make all the payments due on their 
obligation to defendant, which obligation was secured by a deed of 
trust on the Property. (Affidavit, HH6-8, 10, 15.) 
10. The Court entered a Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in 
Plaintiffs (the " Judgment") on June 15, 1994, based upon 
defendant's failure to respond to the plaintiffs' complaint. 
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ARGUMENT 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for relief 
from judgment in certain situations, including "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" (Rule 60(b)(1), 
"fraud • . . misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party" (Rule 60(b)(3), "when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e)" (Rule 60(b)(4), or "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" (Rule 
60(b)(7). A motion for relief under Rule 60(b) must be timely 
made, no more than three months after entry in the case of Rule 
60(b)(1), (3) and (4). 
This motion is brought within three months following the entry 
of the Judgment, and the facts of this case clearly warrant relief 
from the Judgment. Defendant was not personally served with a 
summons and complaint and was not aware of this case or the 
Judgment until July 21, 1994. The facts demonstrate that the 
Judgment was entered by reason of either mistake or fraud on the 
part of plaintiffs' counsel. 
From the Court's file, it appears that counsel for the 
plaintiffs, either by design or neglect, sent the summons and 
complaint for service on the defendant at the address for the U.S. 
Post Office on 2100 South. It is, frankly, inconceivable that a 
process server would make 23 attempts to serve the defendant at 
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that location. However, that is the conclusion that seems most 
likely from the available facts. 
I In fact, plaintiffs' counsel knew that defendant had an 
address of 6270 South Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084 because 
he sent a letter dated November 18, 1993 to the defendant at that 
address and received a reply from the defendant* Whether he failed 
to use it intentionally or by negligence, he nonetheless failed to 
use it. Had he done so, it is very likely that service would have 
been promptly accomplished and defendant would have had an 
| opportunity to defend himself against plaintiffs' claims. 
I Where a reasonable excuse is offered by the defaulting party, 
I the court should favor granting relief from a default judgment, 
A unless to do so would result in substantial injustice to the 
adverse party. Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
[Contractor. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). It is usually not 
| appropriate to examine the merits of the claim decided by default 
a on a motion under Rule 60(b). Larsen v. Collins. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 
11984). 
I Defendant clearly has a reasonable excuse for failing to 
[ respond to the complaint in this case. He was not even aware of 
II 
its existence until after the Judgment was entered. The Court 
| needn't examine the merits of plaintiffs' claims at this time. 
| Even were it to do so, defendant has set forth facts which would 
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clearly require a trial or evidentiary hearing in order for the 
Court to render ^ reasoned decision on plaintiffs' claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should set aside the Judgment and grant defendant 
reasonable time to file a responsive pleading to the plaintiffs' 
complaint• 
DATED this _G_ day of September, 1994. 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
:t Lunc^erg 
By \ /^<PdtJ^Mj*> 9-J./Sfcot c^ fAttor^/ys for Defendarf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the of September, 1994, I caused a 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
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J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020) 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290 
Telephone: (801) 363-2262 
L&A Case No. X0045 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 









AFFIDAVIT OF LESTER ROMERO 
Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lester Romero, having been duly sworn, states and represents 
as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, over the age 
of 21 years. 
2. I am the defendant in this action. 
3. I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge, 
unless noted otherwise, and would so testify in court if called as 
a witness in this case. 
4. In 1960, I was the owner of the property subject of this 
action (the "Property"). 
5. At that time, my former wife's parents, the plaintiffs in 
this action, were having a difficult time financially and I agreed 
to sell them the Property for $6,000.00. 
6. The purchase price for the Property was paid in the form 
of a promissory note in the amount of $6,000.00, secured by a deed 
of trust in my favor. In addition, the plaintiffs executed a quit 
claim deed on the Property which I held as additional security. 
7. The plaintiffs did not make all the payments required by 
the promissory note in a timely fashion and I had to constantly 
work with them to get the required payments. 
8. At no time did I allow more than three (3) years to go by 
without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs. 
9. The plaintiffs paid the real property taxes on the 
Property as required by the deed of trust. 
10. There have been disagreements between me and the 
plaintiffs on the amount still due on the promissory note for 
several years. 
11. Not being able to convince the plaintiffs to make the 
payments still due, I recorded the quit claim deed on May 24, 1993. 
12. Thereafter, I received a letter from plaintiff's 
attorney, George Fadel, dated November 18, 1993. A copy is 
attached as Exhibit "A.M 
13. The November 18, 1993 letter was addressed to me at two 
(2) addresses: (a) 6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084; and 
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a 
(b) General Delivery, 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City# UT 
84111. 
14. I received the November 18, 1993 letter at my home at 
6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084. 
15. In response to Mr. Fadel's letter, I sent a lengthy reply 
indicating that the plaintiffs had not paid the promissory note off 
and that I recorded the quit claim deed pursuant to the agreement 
I had with the plaintiffs that I would do so if they did not pay. 
A copy of my letter is attached as Exhibit MB.M 
16. I heard nothing further from Mr. Fadel or the plaintiffs. 
17. On July 20, 1994, I visited the clerk of the Court in 
Davis County to determine what additional action, if any, I needed 
to take after recording the quit claim deed. 
18. At that time, personnel in the clerk's office indicated 
that a case had been filed which involved the Property. I left a 
written request that the clerk's office send me a copy of the 
docket sheet. 
19. On July 21, 1994, I received a copy of the docket sheet 
in this case and learned, for the first time, of the existence of 
this case. 
20. I have reviewed the pleadings filed by Mr. Fadel, 
particularly those filed in support of his motion or application 
for an order authorizing service of process by publication. 
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21. I have never lived at the address of 1760 West 2100 
South. In fact, it is common knowledge that that is the address 
for the post office. 
22. Mr. Fadel's motion states that 23 attempts were made to 
serve the summons and complaint on me, yet he apparently neglected 
or failed to file any affidavit or return of service from the 
Sheriff's office supporting that contention. 
23. Mr. Fadel fails to state in his motion what address was 
used in an attempt to serve me with the summons and complaint. Yet 
the order for publication, prepared by him# states that the last 
known address for me was the 1760 West 2100 South address, the 
address of the post office. 
24. I don't know officer Jack Hill or officer Ron Jensen of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office. 
25. I had no knowledge of any attempt to serve me with the 
summons and complaint, and I made no effort to evade any such 
attempt• 
DATED this^ fe day of September, Wi. ^>j 
Lester Romero 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Lester Romero this <f_ 
day of September, 1994. 
My Commission Expires NotarjnPublic 
i i Resid\ing at; _ , ^ ^ nn-.nr.trfr I ""^ 
' %535%4y Hf cSrnrniMJon Ex^ J I ^0*mf^y^ October 19 IJK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING L J i S ^ State of l)tah~ 
4K 
I certify that on the 7 day of September, 1994, I caused a 
I copy of the foregoing Affidavit to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 




GEORGE K. F A D E L 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
KOCK-MANOI 
1 7 0 W E S T 4 0 0 SOUTH BOUNTIFUL. U T A H 8 4 0 1 0 
November- 18, 1993 
Mr. Lester Romero 
6270 Margray Drive 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
General Delivery 
1760 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Romero: 
I have been consulted and retained by Glen D. Wardle and Thora 
Wardle concerning the Trust Deed and Quitclaim Deed you recorded 
May 24, 1993, against their home at 320 East Center Street, North 
Salt Lake, Utah. 
If you have any claim to the property at all at this date, 
your proper remedy would be to pursue a foreclosure of the Trust 
Deed but not to record the Quitclaim Deed. Presumably the 
Quitclaim Deed made on the same date as the Trust Deed, March 1, 
1960, was only intended as a mortgage. 
You are requested to quitclaim the property back to the 
Wardles. If you desire to discuss the possibility of a settlement 
of any claim you may have, please call me at 295-2421. 
If we have not resolved this matter in the next few weeks, we 
shall be required to commence appropriate proceedings to remove the 
deed cloud by a quiet title action, and request punitive damages. 
EXHIBIT^ 
.H 
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George K. Fadel #1027 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
295-2421 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 







} MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
| QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF 
| Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The plaintiff submits this memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion to set aside the judgment. 
Attached hereto is a copy of the Quit Claim Deed recorded by 
the defendant which shows an address of 1760 West 2100 South, 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111. Also attached is a copy of the 
envelope postmarked December 13f 1993 which contained 
correspondence from the defendant with a return address of 
"Airport Motel, 6270 S. 2005 W., West Jordan, Utah 84084. 
An affidavit will be forthcoming from Jack Hill, Deputy 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah whose return shows 23 attempts 
to serve the defendant and the address given at which to serve 
was 6270 Margray. Officer Hill previously advised that he had 
known the defendant and that the defendant was deliberately 
avoiding service by failing to answer the door. 
No payment or acknowledgement of the debt was made after 
1980f and the applicable statute of limitations is six years. 
The applicable statutory provision for tolling the statute is 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-44: 
In any case founded on contract, when 
any part of the principal or interest shall 
have been paidf or an acknowledgment of an 
existing liability, debt or claimf or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the 
provisions of any statute, it shall be 
unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. 
Contrary to the affidavit of Romero which implies that 
payment of taxes may toll the statute, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Upton v. Heiselt Const. Co, 208 P.2d 945 (Utah 1949) held that: 
The payment of taxes is an obligation of 
property ownership, and is an act necessary 
in order to preserve and protect one's 
property. It is an equivocal act so far as 
recognition of any contract obligation is 
concerned, in that it is an act which would 
be performed by the property owner without 
regard to the existence or non-existence of 
an obligation on a note and mortgage. His 
payment of taxes does not of itself indicate 
that he had in mind that there was an 
outstanding contractual obligation requiring 
him to make that payment. He could well make 
such a payment and have in mind that he was 
under no contractual obligation to do so. It 
is reasonable to say, then, that the mere 
payment of taxes by the property owner is not 
os sufficient probative value to indicate the 
existence of a contractual obligation to do 
so, and, thereforer does not constitute a 
payment . . . which will toll the statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 948. 
The defendant cites Rule 60 (b)(4) as a basis for setting 
aside a judgment "when for any causef the summons in an action 
has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action." Rule 4 (e) relates to personal service. Rule 4 (g) 
relates to other service where personal service cannot be made 
and service is made by publication for a judgment in rem and not 
a judgment in personam. The judgment rendered in the above 
entitled action was solely in rem. The Court specifically stated 
from the bench that no other relief requiring personal service 
would be granted. 
The Sheriff• s affidavit is expected to follow. 
The defendant motion should be denied. 
en 
DATED this / day of September, 1994. 
dfeorge K. Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
IN PLAINTIFFS to J. Scott Lundberg, P.O. Box 1290, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110-1290, this y fr day of September, 1994. 
J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020) 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290 
Telephone: (801) 363-2262 
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THORA REPLY TO MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE IN 
PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant, through his counsel, submits the following reply to 
the Memorandum Opposing Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree 
Quieting Title in Plaintiffs filed by the plaintiffs (the 
"Plaintiff's Memorandum")• 
POINT I 
The Court Should Not Examine the Merits of 
Plaintiffs' Case in Ruling on a Motion under 
Rule 60(b). 
Plaintiffs attempt to confuse the issue before the Court by 
arguing [apparently] that the statute of limitations expired on the 
debt to defendant which was secured by both a deed of trust and a 
quit claim deed. They also cite, erroneously, to a case dealing 
with the payment of taxes and the question of whether the payment 
tolls the statute of limitations. 
A First, plaintiffs7 attempts to argue the merits of their case 
an inappropriate here. As indicated in the Memorandum filed in 
support of defendant's motion, the Court need not evaluate the 
| merits of the underlying case in deciding a motion to set aside a 
I default judgment• 
I Second, even if it were appropriate to argue the merits of the 
underlying case, plaintiffs' attempts to do so are unpersuasive. 
I Without any basis in fact, plaintiffs' counsel states that Mno 
A payment or acknowledgement of the debt was made after 1980.M That 
statement is directly contradicted by the Affidavit of Lester 
I Romero filed in support of defendant's motion. Mr. Romero, under 
loath, stated that "[a]t no time did I allow more than three (3) 
| years to go by without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs." 
1 Plaintiffs' citation to Upton v. Heiselt Const. Co., 208 P.2d 
945 (Utah 1949) is apparently based upon plaintiffs' erroneous 
| assumption that defendant argues that plaintiffs' continued payment 
U of taxes evidences the existence of the obligation. In fact, the 
| mention in the Affidavit of Lester Romero of payment of taxes was 
intended to counter the arguments originally made by plaintiffs in 
their complaint and motion for entry of default judgment (and 
reflected in the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared 
| by plaintiffs' counsel) that their payment of the taxes bolstered 
-2-
their claim to ownership of the property (apparently an attempt to 
invoke the doctrine of adverse possession). Mr. Romero's reference 
to the payment of taxes was intended only to rebut that reliance on 
an adverse possession theory. Adverse possession based upon 
payment of taxes is inappropriate in a situation where the occupant 
of the property is under contractual obligation to the other party 
to pay those taxes. 
POINT II 
Adequate Cause Exists for the Court to Grant 
Relief under Rule 60(b). 
Plaintiffs argue that Rule 60(b)(4) doesn't support 
defendant's motion because the case was in rem and personal service 
isn't required. Even if the Court is persuaded by plaintiffs' 
position on that point, plaintiffs failed to address the other 
three (3) bases for relief relied upon by the defendant. 
Rule 60(b)1) provides for relief from a default judgment in 
cases involving "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect." Rule 60(b)(3) provides for relief in situations 
involving "fraud . • • misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party." Finally, Rule 60(b)(7) provides for relief for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." 
One or more of those provisions applies to the situation 
presented by the facts of this case. As clearly evidenced by the 
Affidavit of Lester Romero, defendant was completely surprised by 
-3-
the judgment entered. He had no notice whatsoever of the 
proceeding or the judgment until after it had been entered. 
Plaintiffs attempt to explain their use of the address for the 
General Office of the United States Postal Service by attaching a 
copy of a quit claim deed. Careful examination of the deed 
indicates that it was originally prepared in 1960, long before Mr. 
Fadel's letter to defendant (dated November 18, 1993) at the 
correct address of 6270 Margray, West Jordan, Utah. The 1760 West 
2100 South address clearly was that for Mr. Horace Knowlton# the 
attorney for defendant at the time the document was prepared in 
I960. Even if that address were supplied by the defendant, it was 
before plaintiffs' counsel successfully contacted defendant at the 
West Jordan address. It is inexcusable for plaintiffs' counsel to 
even refer to that address in his attempts to serve the defendant. 
With little effort, plaintiffs' counsel could have ascertained 
that the address of 6270 South 2005 West ("Airport Motel") is the 
same as 6270 Margray. There is obviously no motel there. By the 
attachment of the envelope from the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel 
concedes the fact that he contacted defendant using the 6270 
Margray address, further confirming the fact that he was negligent, 
if not fraudulent, in suggesting to the Court anything about the 
defendant's address being 1760 West 2100 South. [Note that the 
order authorizing publication of summons, prepared by plaintiffs' 
-4-
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counsel, states specifically that the last known address for the 
defendant is 1760 West 2100 South.] 
CONCLUSION 
Nowhere in Plaintiffs' Memorandum is there any showing that 
defendant received actual notice of the pendency of this action, 
despite the fact that plaintiffs' attorney knew that defendant 
lived at 6270 Margray in West Jordan. Defendant's motion was 
timely filed. Plaintiffs' Memorandum reflects no facts that 
support an argument that any prejudice will result to the 
plaintiffs by granting the motion. Defendant should be entitled to 
present his case to the Court. In view of the inconsistencies in 
the actions and representations of plaintiffs' counsel, relief from 
the default judgment is appropriate in this case. Defendant's 
motion should be granted. 
DATED this 1£ day of September, 1994. 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
By 
Jy/Siott Lun 
Attorneys for De 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 12- day of September, 1994, I caused a 
copy of the foregoing Reply to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
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George K. Fadel 11027 
Attorney for Flaintiffu 
170 Meet 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
295-2421 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AMD FOR DAVIS COUNT*, 
STATE OF UTAH 








MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING tlTLB III MAlNTirr 
Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Attached hereto is the affidavit of the Sheriff"of Salt Lake 
County as to attemped service of summons upon the defendant. 
Dated this 15th day of September, 1994. 
FADEL 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I mailed a copy hereof to Mr. J. Scott Lundberg, attorney 
for defendant, P.O. Box 1290, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 this 
15th day of September, 1994. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
I, Deputy Jack Hill, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: 
That I am a citizen of the United States over the age of twenty-one years at the time 
of service herein, and not a party to this action. 
That I received the hereto annexed summons, complaint on the 5th day of January, 
1994. Between the dates of January 13, 1994 and March 11, 1994, I attempted service of 
said paper a total of 23 times (dates listed below). 
That the address I attempted service is 6270 S. Margray Dr. 
Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 8th day of September, 1994. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of September, 1994. 
Docket ft 941658 
By 7 / OMJAjX 
Notary I\iblic residing in S; alt Lake City, Utah 


























437 South 200 East 
Salt Lata City, UT8<111 
My Ccrruntesicn Expires 
Jaguar* 20 £95 
SUfEGPtnAH 
ADDENDUM 3: RULING AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE QUIETING TITLE IN 
PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 940700002 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed the memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and 
Defendant on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgement and Decree Quieting Title in 
Plaintiffs, the other documents on file with the Court, and being fully advised in the premises, 
the Court hereby enters the following findings and ruling: 
1. The Court hereby finds that the instant case was commenced on January 3, 
1994. 
2. That on or about January 3, 1994, Plaintiffs supplied an original Summons and 
a copy of said Summons and Complaint with the Civil Process Division of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Office. 
3. That the address indicated for Defendant was "6270 So. Margray Dr., West 
Jordan." 
4. That at the time of the events in question, Defendant in fact resided at the 6270 
So. Margray Dr., West Jordan. 
5. That Deputy Hill received Plaintiffs' Summons and Complaint on January 5, 
1994, and unsuccessfully attempted to serve said summons and complaint on Defendant 
twenty-three (23) times between the dates of January 13, 1994 and March l l f 1994. 
Additionally, the Court further finds that Deputy Hill attempted the foregoing service at 6270 
S. Margray Dr. 
6. That by attempting to serve Defendant twenty-three (23) times at his correct 
address, i.e., 6270 S. Margray Dr., Plaintiffs in good faith exercised reasonable diligence in 
attempting to search for or ascertain the whereabouts of Defendant. See Downey State Bank 
v. Maior-Blackenev Corp.. 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); see also Carlson v. Boss, 740 P.2d 
1269, 1276-1278. (Utah 1987). 
7. That the property that is the subject of the underlying action is located in Davis 
County. 
8. That Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Service of Process by Publication and Order, 
dated April 12, 1994, which the Court granted authorizing service of process upon Defendant 
by publication and by mail at Defendant's last known address. 
9. That Plaintiffs' Summons was first published in the Davis County Clipper on 
April 15, 1994, and was published in each issue of said newspaper for three (3) weeks, the 
last publication being in the issue dated May 6, 1994. 
10. That Plaintiffs either through mistake or inadvertence represented to the Court 
that Defendant's last known address was 1760 West 2100 South. 
11. That the 1760 West 2100 South address is the general delivery address for the 
United States Post Office. 
12. That service by mail was subsequently unsuccessfully attempted twice at the 
1760 West 2100 South address. 
13. That, notwithstanding said mistake, based on Deputy Hill's attempt to serve 
said summons and complaint on Defendant twenty-three (23) times between the dates of 
January 13, 1994 and March 11, 1994, and the fact that Plaintiffs' Summons was published in 
the Davis County Clipper on April 15, 1994, and was published in each issue of said 
newspaper for three (3) weeks, the last publication being in the issue dated May 6, 1994, 
service of process under all the circumstances was reasonably calculated to apprise Defendant 
of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonable or practicable as required under Rules 
4(e) and 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
14. Indeed, the Court finds that, in total, service was attempted over a period of 
approximately three (3) months, i.e., January 13, 1994 to March 13, 1994, (personal), and 
April 15, 1994 to May 6, 1994, (publication). Thus, 
15. Finally, the Court finds pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiffs1 Summons and Complaint within the 
statutorily prescribed twenty (20) day period. 
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgement and Decree 
Quieting Title in Plaintiffs. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare an order consistent 
with this ruling and submit the same to opposing counsel prior to the time it is submitted to 
the Court for signature. 
Dated this 2$*^ day of December, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed to the 
following parties this 23 day of December, 1994: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
J. Scott Lundberg 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
.jJLJ 9. 
Michael D. Di Reda >> 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Rodney S. Page 
J H H I 2 10 au &H '95 
George K. Fadel #1027 Jun 
Attorney for Plaintiffs . .,...-T 
170 West 400 South CLEr.K, ^ .~M; : : .<-• 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 BY ^~,_ 
295-2421 DEPUTY GLv-FK 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 






ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 940700002 QT 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The Court rendered a Judgment and Decree Quieting Titled in 
Plaintiffs to property situated at 320 East Center Street, North 
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah, on June 15, 1994, upon 
application of the plaintiffs for entry of default of the defendant 
and for judgment by default. Defendant filed a motion to set aside 
the judgment and decree dated September 6, 1994, asserting lack of 
personal service. The court has reviewed the memoranda of both 
parties and the file and has issued its Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Set. Aside Judgment and Decree Quieting Title for 
Plaintiffs wherein the Court has made its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that service of process in this in rem action 
was proper, the plaintiffs having exercised reasonable diligence 
to serve the defendant personally. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Decree Quieting Titled in Plaintiffs be, and the same is hereby 
denied. 
2. That the Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs 
dated June 15, 1994, entered June 16, 1994, is in no manner 
affected by the defendant's motion to set aside the same. 
DATED this » ^ day of January, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
District cJudqe Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
^ I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the proposed order 
denying the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment herein to 
Mr. J. Scott Lundberg, attorney for defendant, P.O. Box 1290, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110 this 7 ^ day of December, 1994. 
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The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of 
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF AGENCY 
This is a Petition For Review of an Order of the Utah 
Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred 
by ignoring competent, reliable and credible 
evidence of the industrial cause of 
Applicant's accident and by finding no 
industrial accident occurred. 
The standard of review is the "substantial evidence" standard. 
(See Willardson vs. Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 
App. 1993); King vs. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 
(Utah App. 1993)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86 states as follows: 
"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, 
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any 
order." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On February 3, 1994, Petitioner filed an Industrial Disease 
and Accident Claim with the Industrial Commission. The Petitioner 
was claiming that her on-the-job activities, which included 
2 
standing to watch a moving conveyor belt for approximately 11 hours 
caused her to faint and sustain a concussion and head injury. 
Defendants claim that Petitioner's recent bout with bronchitis 
and inner ear infection caused her to faint and hit her head on the 
floor and thus, denied her claim. 
The medical records indicate that Petitioner had been awake 
for approximately 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident. 
The Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Colver reported that the 
Petitioner's fainting was probably due to a generalized weakness 
and working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. Dr. Colver goes on to indicate that the Petitioner's 
fainting may also have had some labyrinthitis with some vertigo 
which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor 
belt. 
On or about October 12, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge 
found that Petitioner's industrial accident was not a result of her 
work activities. However, in so doing, he ignored competent, 
credible evidence that Petitioner's work activities and conditions 
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident. On or 
about February 17, 1995, the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision, failing to give adequate 
weight to a clarifying letter from Dr. Colver dated March 21, 1994, 
wherein, he stated that Petitioner's physical condition was 
3 
aggravated by working too hard and being on her feet which could 
have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor belt. However, 
the Industrial Commission referred to his opinion as "conjecture". 
The Industrial Commission also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the Petitioner's emergency room physician, Dr. 
Egbert, who's report indicates that considering the nature of the 
Petitioner's work he believed that the most likely the cause of her 
passing out was motion sickness due to the watching of the conveyor 
belt going past her. However, the Industrial Commission referred 
to his opinion as "conjecture". 
The Industrial Commission also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the Summary of Medical Records submitted by Dr. 
Clark. Dr. Clark specifically states that there is a medically 
demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident 
and the problems for which Petitioner was treated. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
At the time of the accident, the Applicant was 75 years old 
and had been working for Stouffer Foods for only 3 days. The shift 
that she had been working, and was working at the time of the 
accident, began at 3:00 p.m. and was to end at 11:00 p.m. At the 
time of Applicant's injury she had been getting less sleep than 
normal because her sleep pattern had been disturbed by the new job. 
She had recently suffered a cough without fever, chills, sweats and 
4 
a sore throat, from which she was recovering. At the time of the 
accident, Applicant had completed her shift and was working 
overtime. 
The Applicant's duties consisted of standing next to a 
conveyor belt which transported frozen food and watching the boxes 
as they came down the conveyor belt. If any of the boxes needed to 
be readjusted, Applicant would do so. On the night of the 
industrial accident, Applicant had a meal break from 7:30 p.m. to 
8:30 p.m. in the cafeteria. Through-out her 8 hour shift and the 
overtime, the Applicant had been standing. Sometime shortly after 
12:13 a.m., during the overtime shift, the Applicant looked up at 
the ceiling lights and then at the boxes as they moved along the 
conveyor belt and began to feel light headed. Applicant testified 
that she did not feel ill or faint. From that point on, the 
Applicant had no recollection of what happened. Sometime soon 
thereafter, Applicant fell backwards hitting her head on the tile 
floor. The Applicant was placed in a stretcher and transported to 
Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah, where she was hospitalized 
for 3 days. Prior to working at Stouffer Foods, the Applicant had 
been out of the work force for a considerable period of time. On 
the day of the accident, the Applicant had been up since 6:00 a.m. 
that morning. The doctor's notes indicated that the Applicant had 
been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident. 
5 
In the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a Registered Nurse, employed 
by Stouffer Foods for 7 years, testified that she knew of other 
employees on another conveyor line who had become nauseous or light 
headed. Ms. Nelson testified that on the other conveyor line the 
movement of the belt would make people light headed. She stated 
that many of the people who became light headed had been pregnant. 
Ms. Nelson also testified that to her knowledge, no one had fainted 
or had light headiness problems on the conveyor line in which the 
Applicant had been working. 
Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found the 
Applicant had an abnormal EEC However, it is not clear from the 
medical records whether the abnormal EEG occurred as a result of 
the fall or was present prior to the fall. 
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "On December 7, 
1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected that the fall was due 
to a syncope based upon a generalized weakness due to resolving 
bronchitis and possibly due to mild labyrinthitis exacerbated by 
working on her feet at a moving conveyor belt all day." (See Page 
3 of Order) The Industrial Commission also stated that Dr. 
Colver's opinion of the cause of the fall was conjecture (See 
Addendum E page 3). However, what Dr. Colver stated was: 
Syncope. This is probably due to a 
generalized weakness and working too hard on 
her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. She may have also had some 
6 
labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could 
have been exacerbated by the motion of the 
conveyor belt. (Emphasis added) (See Addendum 
A). 
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to mention, and the 
Industrial Commission ignored a letter from Dr. Colver, dated March 
21, 1994, which was submitted by the Applicant. Said letter 
stated: 
In response to your questions in the letter 
dated March 12, 1994, you asked if my report 
states that you had a inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter 
from Mr. Keith F. Walquist, dated March 8, 
1994, states: "also he reported that you had a 
inflammation of the inner ear which could 
cause vertigo". 
Mr. Walquist is misquoting me. My note dated 
7-7-93, says that she may have also had some 
labyrinthitis with some vertigo. Thus, I did 
not say that you had an inflammation of the 
inner ear, I merely hypothesized that it was 
possible. 
There is no way of knowing from my reports or 
examination if you had a inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. 
I did feel the most likely cause of your 
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness 
and working too hard on your feet after 
getting over a bout of bronchitis". My 
records indicate that you had a cough from 
which you were recovering when you went back 
to work and had the accident...(Emphasis 
added). 
(See Addendum B) 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
also failed to give adequate consideration to a letter of December 
7 
14, 1993, from the Applicant's emergency room physician, Dr. L. 
Dean Egbert. Dr. Egbert states the following: 
Mrs. Brunson is a 74 year old women that I saw 
in the emergency department on 12-7-93, after 
falling while working at a conveyor belt while 
working at Stouffers. She had been working 
there for only 2 days, she did not feel any 
spinning sensation, simply became light 
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor 
sustaining a contusion of her brain. She was 
admitted to the hospital. As far as I know, 
no other specific cause of the blacking-out 
episode was found. Considering the nature of 
this work I think that the most likely cause 
of her passing out was motion sickness due to 
watching the conveyor belt go passed (sic) 
her. (Emphasis added) 
(See Addendum C) 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission 
also failed to give proper weight to the Summary of Medical Record 
which was signed by Dr. John R. Clark, the Applicant's 
neurosurgeon. In said Summary of Medical Records, it is 
specifically stated that there is a medically demonstrative causal 
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems for 
which she was treated. (See Addendum D) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission ignored and disregarded competent, reliable and 
credible evidence from the petitioner's treating physicians when it 
found that the petitioner's industrial injury was caused by a pre-
existing condition rather than as a result of her fainting while 
watching the conveyor belt. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE 
AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN 
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT. 
The Court of Appeals has authority to reverse the Industrial 
Commission's Order. (See U.C.A. §35-1-86). The standard applied 
by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the Industrial Commission's 
Order is "substantial evidence". (See Willardson vs. Industrial 
Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993); King vs. Industrial 
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993)). "Substantial 
evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (See Willardson vs. 
Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Industrial Commission adopted the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact (See Addendum F page 1). Thus, this 
appeal includes issues covered in the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
The Industrial Commission arbitrarily disregarded competent 
evidence when it affirmed the Administrative Law Judge and found 
that the applicant had failed to establish medical causation. In 
Nicholson vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1964), the Supreme Court recognized the fact that it would not 
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disturb the findings or the order of the Commission if they were 
supported by "substantial evidence". However, at the same time 
they recognized that the Supreme Court has a duty, particularly 
with reference to the denial of compensation, to determine whether 
the Commission has arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in 
making its decision. 
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings, the last paragraph 
on page three, it states: 
A preponderance of evidence shows that Mrs. 
Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at 
work because of her idiopathic condition 
without any enhancement from the work place. 
Although, there has been speculation about why 
she had the fainting episode there is no 
evidence which can be set-forth which meets 
the standard of a reasonable medical 
probability. (See Addendum E) 
"Medical causation demands that petitioner *prove (his) 
disability is medically the result of a exertion or injury that 
occurred during a work-related activity.'" Allen vs. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). ""The key question in 
determining causation is whether given this body and this exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury.'" Stouffer Foods 
Corp. vs. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah App. 1990) 
(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 24). In order to answer this question, 
we must focus on what exertions by Petitioner are involved. See 
id.; Nyrehn vs. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App. 
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1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Colver stated on 
two occasions, that although, petitioner's physical condition was 
weaker than usual, it was aggravated by, "...working too hard on 
her feet..." and "...could have been exacerbated by the motion of 
the conveyor belt". In his clarifying letter of March 21, 1994, 
Dr. Colver goes on to state in more definitive terms, "I do feel 
the most likely cause of your fainting was, 'due to a generalized 
weakness and working too hard on your feet after getting over a 
bout a bronchitis'". (emphasis added). 
As also pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein, the 
December 14, 1993, letter of L. Dean Egbert, M.D., the emergency 
room physician, stated, also in definitive terms, his opinion of 
the cause of the Applicant's injury. He stated: 
Considering the nature of this work, I think 
the mostly likely cause of her passing out was 
motion sickness due to watching the conveyor 
belt go passed her. (emphasis added). 
The Administrative Law Judge states in his Findings that there 
was no evidence that had been set-forth which meets the standard of 
a reasonable medical probability. The definition of medical 
probability, according to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition, page 318, is as follows: 
Possibility* Probability: These are terms that 
refer to the likelihood or chance that an 
injury or illness was caused or aggravated by 
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a particular factor. "Possibility" sometimes 
is used to imply a likelihood of less than 
50%; "probability" sometimes is used to imply 
likelihood of greater than 50%. (See Addendum 
G). 
The opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert both state, "the 
most likely cause" of the Applicant's injury was due to working too 
hard, being on her feet for extended period of time, and motion 
sickness from watching the conveyor belt. The words, "most likely 
cause" certainly indicate that, in their medical opinion, there is 
more than a 50% likelihood that the of the cause of the accident 
was the Applicant being on her feet for an extended period of time, 
working too hard, and motion sickness from watching the conveyor 
belt. Thus, both treating physicians opined that it was medically 
probable that the cause of the accident was industrially related. 
Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge ignored opinions of 
reasonable medical probability from the two treating physicians 
that the injury was in fact caused by conditions of the Applicant's 
employment. Dr. Clark's opinion that petitioner's injury was 
directly related to an industrial accident compounds further the 
evidence in favor of petitioner. 
It is well established that if a pre-existing condition is 
aggravated by working conditions, resulting in an injury, as long 
as the activity which caused the injury was extraordinary in 
nature, causation is established and workers compensation benefits 
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should be ordered. (See Allen vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 
15 (Utah 1986)). Certainly, standing on one's feet for nine or more 
hours watching a conveyor belt would be considered an extraordinary 
activity. An ordinary 20th century person would not usually engage 
in a similar exertion in everyday, nonindustrial life. (See Allen 
vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986)). As is set-
forth herein, the Applicant did not suffer from an idiopathic fall. 
The Applicant was recovering from some pre-existing conditions, and 
consequently, may have been in a weakened state. However, as 
stated by the opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert, it is more 
than likely that the cause of the accident was the aggravation of 
those pre-existing conditions by the long hours the Applicant was 
working, standing on her feet the entire time and the motion 
sickness that she incurred by watching the conveyor belt. This is 
also supported by the testimony of Victoria Nelson, the Registered 
Nurse employed by Stouffer Foods, who testified that other 
employees at Stouffer Foods had become nauseous and light headed by 
watching the conveyor belt. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner requests that this Court find that the Commission, 
in denying petitioner's application for benefits, arbitrarily 
disregarded competent evidence in when it determined that the 
petitioner's job-related-activities did not cause the industrial 
13 
accident. There simply is no evidence to indicate otherwise. 
Thus, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
Order reversing the Industrial Commission's Order in this matter. 
DATED this J ^ day of July, 1995. 
. FREI 
^rv<^-. 
WAYNE A ESTONE 








MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL 
1000 East# U.S. Highway 6 
Payson, Utah 84651 
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12-7-93 
Consulting Physician: Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
Referring Physician: John R. Clark, M.D. 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: 
This is a 75-year-old white female patient admitted by Dr. Clark 
because of syncope and cerebral contusion. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
The patient recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or 
sore throat from which she was recovering. She returned to her new 
job working at a conveyer belt at Stouffer's yesterday evening and 
after standing for almost her complete 8 hour shift she felt dizzy 
and then fell backwards with apparent loss of consciousness and 
struck the back 'of her head. She sustained a laceration and a 
cerebral contusion. Apparently she had no chest pain, 
palpitations, or shortness of breath. It is unclear whether her 
dizziness was vertigo or light headedness. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
1. Partial thyroidectomy in 1973, now on chronic Synthroid 
therapy. 
2. Appendectomy in 1967.' 
3. Spinal meningitis without sequelae in 1958. ,*(*•' 
\?*<*S ^y 4. Brief syncopal episode many years ago while in a shower after 
' getting over a cold. J/j 
MEDICATIONS: Synthroid, one pink pill per day. 
ALLERGIES: None known. 
HABITS: None. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: 




Page 2 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: 
Otherwise negative except for significant hearing loss. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: 
General: This is a sleepy white female with a left hearing aid. 
HEENT: Head: She has a laceration on the back of her head. 
Eyes: The pupils are equal and round and respond to 
light. 
Ears: The tympanic membranes were difficult to 
visualize due to narrow canals. 
Throat: Clear. 
Lungs: Clear. 
Cardiac: Normal SI and S2, 2/6 systolic murmur at the upper left 
sternal border. 
Abdomen: Bowel sounds present, 
tender. 
The abdomen is soft and non-
Extremities: Without cyanosis, clubbing or edema. 
Neural: Mental status is alert and oriented. Cranial nerves II 
through XII show decreased hearing, otherwise intact. 
Motor strength is 4 to 5/5 in all extremities. Sensory: 
She has light touch sensation in all extremities. Deep 
tendon reflexes: There is a +2 left prepatellar and a 
trace right prepatellar reflex. Babinski's are absent. 
Laboratory: 
IMPRESSION AND PLAN: 
EKG shows possible left anterior fascicular block, 
otherwise normal. Chemistries include a glucose of 
137, LDH 200. CBC: WBC 6.2, hematocrit 39.4. CBC 
unremarkable. 
i<r <$ vy&M-* 
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Syncope. This is probably due to a generalized weakness and 
working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of 
bronchitis. She may have also had some labyrinthitis with i 
some vertigo which could have been exacerbated by the motion -Kr /,.,/ 
of the conveyer belt. There has been no arrhythmias<rahd no •»''»''' 
indication of other cause of syncope. The preliminary report 
jC^ on the carotid ultrasound shows very trace left plaque and 
hone on the right. I would like to check some cardiac enzymes 
and also check the urinalysis. If these are negative, I do 
Brunson, Reba 
Consultation Report 
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not feel strongly that any further for the workup for the 
cause of syncope is indicated. I do agree with the EEG as 
already ordered by Dr. Clark. 
2. History of thyroidectomy. Will resume her S>nthroid 0.2 mg 
QD. 
KEVIN J. COLVER, M.D. 
Verified By Electronic Signature 
KJC/cm 
D/ 12-7-93 13:41 




Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
1120 East Highway 6, Suite 1 
Payson, Utah 84651 
March 21, 1994 
Reva Brunson 
91 South 200 East #4 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Dear Mrs, Brunson: 
In response to your questions in the letter dated 12 March 1994, 
you asked if my report states that you had inflammation of the 
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter from Mr. Keith F. 
Wahlquist dated 8 March 1994 states, "also he reported that you 
had an inflammation of the inner ear which could cause vertigo." 
Mr. Wahlquist is misquoting me. My note dated 7-7-93 says that, 
"she may have also have some labyrinthitis with some vertigo." 
Thus I did not say that you had an inflammation of the inner ear, 
I merely hypothesized that this was possible. 
There is no way of knowing from my reports or examination if you 
did have inflammation of the inner ear prior to the accident. 
I did feel the most likely cause of your fainting was, "due to a 
generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after 
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My records indicate that you 
had a cough from which you were recovering when you went back to 
work and had the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists letter 
which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting was 
probably due to your getting over a bout with bronchitis" is 
accurate. 
Sincerely, 





MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL 
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6 
Payson, Utah 84651 
December 14, 1993 ' N / 
(/ L'JJ- h<* 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Re: Reva Brunson 
Attending Physicians: John R. Clark, M.D. 
Kevin J. Colver, M.D. 
Mrs. Brunson is a 74-year-old woman that I saw in the Emergency 
Department on 12-7-93 after falling while working at a conveyer 
belt at Stouffer's. She had been working there for only two days. 
She did not feel »* any spinning sensation, simply became light 
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor sustaining a 
contusion to her brain. She was admitted to the hospital. As far 
as I know, no other specific cause of the blacking out episode was 
found. Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most 
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to watching 
the conveyer belt go past her. 
Sincerely, 
L. Dean Egbert, M.D. 
Emergency Room Physician 
Mountain View Hospital 
LDE/cm 
D/ 12-14-93 9:37 
T/ 12-14-93 10:45 




Industrial Commission of Utah-Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 ft (801)530-6800 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
(to be completed by treating physician) 
EVALUATION FOR: l\^ i/Vi~ J>rn^v^£rW 
DATE OF INJURY: ~~? \\0^- f?*/^ EMPLOYER, 
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? AJO What date?_ 
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? J/o What date?_ 
3. Applicant was required to be off work from *7 O^a. fJ to ^exe**"* 
4. Has applicant a permanent injury? r*° 
5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach 
a final state of recovery? 
6. If there is a permanaent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terras 
of percentage of loss of function: -— 
7. Is there a medicallly demons tractive casna.1 relationship between the 
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? Y*S Please 
explain as necessary: b a^"i~- C^C^ c^c^/s/<rv% oU^^y^djf^ 
8. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the wnat tuture medical treatment will be require 
industrial accident? &£ser*rarr)')f^ oh C<s 
9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
previously existing conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease 
of congenital causes? /* 
10.What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from 
all causes and conditions, including industrial injury? 
11 Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existsing 
condition? Please explain as necessary: AC^/h ^ 
Dated this'ti day of Apn/ 19 4Y 
Physician's, Name (please print) Physician'S"*5peci/alty 
^7*L^ fU*-/£-*> tn?~ M>yA^ 6 **'-z-
Lcian's Signature Street Address *~ " Physician 
Parser* Or SV6S7 Qoi /ytr-yste 
City/St^ete/Zip Physician's Telephone Number 
ADDENDUM E 
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STOUFFER FOODS CORP. and/or 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 













FINDINGS OF FACT, 





Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3CO South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August 
31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. The hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant, Reva Brunson, 
represented herself pro se. 
was present and 
The defendant employer, Stouffer Foods, and its 
insurer, Travelers Insurance, were represented by 
Steven Aerchbacher, Attorney at Law. 
The applicant, Reva Brunson, claims medical expenses and 
temporary total disabilitv. The applicant was initially scheduled 
for a hearing on July 15, 1994. She has a profound hearing loss 
and wears hearing aids. Because her hearing aids were in for 
repair, she was unable to ^ ear the proceedings, and elected, after 
considerable discussion, to delay the hearing until August 31, 
1994. 
On August 31, 1994, arrangements were made by Travelers 
Insurance to have a stenographic reporter present who provided a 
lap top computer by which the applicant could see on a computer 
screen all of the discussion that transpired in the hearing room. 
In addition, as back-up, the Industrial Commission provided a 20 
inch computer screen by which typed questions could be shown to the 
applicant. The 20 inch screen was not necessary since the 
applicant could adequate^, read on the lap top computer screen what 
was transpiring during the session. 
The defendants submitted an additional document on September 
27, 1994, and the applicant submitted her response to it on 
September 30, 1994. The rase was considered ready for an Order on 
October 3, 1994. 
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This case involves a fall at work. The 75 year old applicant, 
who looks younger than her age, had been working for Stouffer Foods 
(Stouffer) for only three days at the time of her injury. During 
her work for Stouffer, her shift was from 3:00 o'clock p.m. to 
11:00 p.m. She was getting less sleep than she normally got, and 
although she had rested prior to going to work, her sleep pattern 
had been disturbed. MR at 16. At the time of her injury, she 
recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or sore throat 
from which she was recovering. She was working overtime. Her job 
was to stand next to a conveyer which transported frozen food and 
to readjust boxes as they came down the conveyer belt. On the 
night of the industrial incident, she had a meal break from 7:30 to 
8:00 p.m. in the cafeteria. 
At about 12:13 a.m., the applicant recited that she felt fine. 
She had been standing during her shift, and during her overtime. 
She looked up at the ceiling lights, and then at the boxes as they 
moved along the conveyor belt. Sometime thereafter she stated that 
she began to feel "light headed". ' She did not feel ill, nor did 
she feel faint. She has no recollection of what happened, but she 
fell backwards, hitting her head on the tile floor. She was placed 
on a stretcher and transported to the Payson Hospital where she was 
hospitalized for three days. 
The applicant had previously worked as a supervising 
seamstress. She had also worked for Carlisle Foods. After a long 
period being out of the work force, she went to work for Stouffer. 
Stouffer instructed all of its employees, including the applicant, 
that if they were injured they were to go to see a company nurse, 
and if they were feeling ill they were to tell a supervisor or 
trainer. 
On the day of this incident, the applicant had been up since 
6:00 a.m. that morning. The doctor's notes indicate that the 
applicant had been awake for' 20 hours at the time of the industrial 
incident. Although the applicant denied that she had been up for 
20 hours, from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight is 20 hours. The applicant 
recited that she rested before she went to work. She claims that 
her problem stemmed from a lack of carbohydrates and attributes her 
fainting to lack of foods high in carbohydrates in Stouffer's 
cafeteria, and the movement of the conveyor on which she adjusted 
the food boxes. 
The defendant employer provides free food to its employees, 
but does not tell them what to eat. The employees may choose such 
food items as they desire. Offered are entree items, salads, 
cereals, snacks, breads, peanut butter, and normal food items 
carried by cafeterias including numerous other carbohydrates. The 
employer is not responsible for providing its employees food. 
REVA BRUNSON 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER 
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The applicant was adamant at the hearing in expressing her 
physical endurance and ability to work for extended periods of 
time. In fact, subsequent to her injury, the applicant recited 
that she had worked from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. in May 1994 for several 
days moving heavy boxes from a storage area. 
The applicant also asserted that her problem with fainting and 
falling while at work at Stouffer was due to the fact that she had 
an extra undershirt on, and that the additional clothing caused her 
to get too warm. 
Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by Stouffer Foods 
for seven years, testified that she has had other people on another 
conveyor line who have become nauseous or light headed. On the 
other conveyor line, the movement of the belt will make people 
light headed. Many of the people who become light headed have been 
pregnant. No one has had fainting or light headedness problems on 
the conveyor line on which the applicant was working to the 
knowledge of Ms. Nelson. The applicant's conveyor line was 
designed differently. 
The applicant suffers from previously existing long standing 
Hypacusis, and Hypothyroidism which is under control by replacement 
medication. Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found an 
abnormal EEC He reported that some of the forms appear 
"suspiciously epileptiform in character." MR at 49 & 8. It is not 
clear from the medical records whether this abnormal EEG occurred 
as a result of the fall, or was present prior to the fall. 
On December 7, 1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected 
that the fall was due to a syncope based upon a generalized 
weakness due to resolving "bronchitis and possibly due to mild 
labyrinthitis exacerbated by working on her feet at a moving 
conveyor belt all day." MR at 53. 
Dr. Clark gave her work releases through March 17, 1994. At 
the time he released her to return to work on March 17, 1994, he 
indicated that she had a post-concussion syndrome which was 
subsiding, as well a slight left ulnar neuropathy. She told Dr. 
Clark that she was afraid to return to work because she works swing 
shift, and at this time of the evening she is most tired and does 
not feel well. She claimed that if she could return to work during 
the day shift that she could handle it because during the day she 
is able to lift items and do her house work. MR at 19. 
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Mrs. Brunson's 
injury coincidentally occurred at work because of her idiopathic 
condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Although 
there has been speculation about why she had the fainting episode, 
there is no evidence which has been set forth which meets the 
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standard of a reasonable medical probability. 
Prior to and at the time of her syncopal episode and fall, 
Mrs. Brunson was not engaged in any activity which created any 
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of her normal 
nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any other 
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did not result from any 
strain, exertion, or stress related to her employment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Mrs. Brunson was not injured by accident arising out of 
and in the course of her employment with her employer. 
2. Neither Mrs. Brunson's employment nor any activities 
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her 
injury. 
3. The fall was related to a'syncopal episode. 
4. Mrs. Brunson is not entitled to workers7 compensation 
benefits as set forth in U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-1 et seq. 
DISCUSSION: 
The general rule concerning causation is that an employee 
cannot recover for a physiological malfunction which is not 
job-induced and which could have happened as easily away from work 
as at work. Thus, in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 
722, 723-24 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery for 
a herniated disc caused by preexisting back problems from another 
job, and which manifested itself when the employee engaged in 
lifting activities which were not strenuous and could have happened 
anywhere. Accord Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango. 674 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1983); Farmers Grain Co-op. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ind. Comm'n 
and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) ; see also Nuzum v. Roosendahl 
Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977); Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 
(Utah 1969) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a different rule applies, 
however, where because of some non-occupational internal weakness 
(such as a fainting spell), an employee falls and sustains an 
injury from the fall. Kennecott v. Ind. Comm'n and Georgas. 675 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, however, that the Georgas 
case did not present the question, and for that reason the Court 
did not decide whether an idiopathic fall to level ground and 
resulting injuries were compensable. Id. at FN 4. Compare. e.g.. 
Williams v. Ind. Comm'n, 38 111.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 744 (1967) 
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(recovery for fall to level floor denied), with Lovett v. Gore 
Newspapers Co. , Fla., 419 So.2d 306 (1982) (recovery allowed). The 
instant case presents the instance of a fall to a level tile floor. 
It will be helpful to first review the statute germane to this 
case. The Utah statute in effect at the time of the injury states 
in pertinent part: 
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
wherever such injury occurred,... shall be paid 
compensation .... 
U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-45 (1988). 
The statute requires an accident "arising out of and in the 
course of" employment. Id. (emphasis added). It is not sufficient 
to have an injury which occurred ir> the course of employment, but 
which did not arise out of the employment. There is no question, 
but that the head injury occurred in the course of her employment. 
However, the question based upon the facts of this case, is whether 
the arising out of prong has been met. The arising out of 
requirement might be met out of the hardness of the tile floor as 
an added employment hazard. A. Larson, Law of Workmen's 
Compensation. Sect. 12.14(e)(1994). As Professor Larson discusses, 
a china dish might survive if dropped on the kitchen linoleum, but 
would not have a chance on the ceramic tile floor of a factory. 
Of the five cases allowing a level-floor award, one involved 
a tile floor (General Ins. Corp. V. Wichersham, 235 S.W.2d 215 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951), three involved a concrete floor (Smith v. 
Container Gen. Corp., 559 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1990); Employers Mut. 
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Comm'n, 41 Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4 
(1953); George v. Great Eastern Food Prod.. 44 N.J. 44, 207 A.2d 
161 (1965), and one involved a "hard wood" floor (Pollock v. 
Studebaker Corp.. 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951). These cases 
indicate that the arising out of prong is satisfied by a physical 
impact with a floor which was the immediate cause of the injury. 
However, the great majority of cases deny recovery where the 
injury occurred upon a tile or concrete floor because these types 
of floors are common outside the work environment, and these types 
of floors present risks which are not unique to work. See e.g., 
Oldham v. Ind. Comm'n. 139 111. App. 3d 594, 93 111. Dec. 868, 487 
N.E. 693 (1985)(the diagnosis was a transient loss of consciousness 
of unknown etiology, and the necessity of standing and the presence 
of a clay tile floor were not risks greater than those outside of 
the employment). 
In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to show 
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that the injury arose out of the employment. There was no showing 
that the applicant's employment posed a risk to her that was 
greater than that to which she would be exposed as a member of the 
general public. There are many homes and businesses which have 
concrete and ceramic tile floors, and had she fainted in any of 
them, her injury would have been as severe. Under the 
circumstances, as much as I would like to give her an award, there 
is unfortunately no legal basis for recovery since the medical 
evidence does not show by a preponderance that her fainting was 
caused by her employment. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim filed by Reva Brunson for 
injuries filed as a result of a fall on December 7, 1993 while 
working on the premises of Stouffer Foods Corporation must be 
dismissed with prejudice since it did not arise out of her 
employment for Stouffer Foods Corporation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of 
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2). 
12, DATED THIS / <^ C day of October 1994, 
ijamim A. Sims ( / 
'"Administrative Law Judge 
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STOUFFER FOODS CORPORATION and 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Reva Brunson asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision denying her claim for benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this 
Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
decision of the ALJ, summarized below. 
Ms. Brunson had worked at Stouffer Foods for only three days prior 
to the accident in question. The accident occurred on December 7, 19 93 
while she was assigned to adjust packages of frozen food that passed by 
on a conveyor belt. Without warning, she fainted and struck her head 
on a tile floor. As a result of the fall, Ms. Brunson suffered a 
concussion and required overnight hospitalization. 
Ms. Brunson can only speculate as to the cause of her fainting 
spell. She has submitted a written statement from Dr. Colver that "the 
most likely" cause of the incident was "a generalized weakness and 
working too hard on your feet after getting over a bout of bronchitis." 
She has also submitted a written statement of Dr. Egbert that "the most 
likely" cause of her accident was "motion sickness due to watching the 
conveyor belt go passed (sic) her." Finally, Dr. Clark states "there 
is a medically demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial 
accident and the problems for which (Ms. Brunson) was treated." 
However, Dr. Clark provides no explanation of his conclusion. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms. 
Brunson had failed to establish that her fainting and resulting injury 
"arose out of and in the course of" her employment at Stouffer Foods. 
The ALJ therefore held that her injury was not compensable under the 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to 
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the course 
of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.) It is the worker's 
burden to prove that his or her employment is both the medical and the 
legal cause of injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 
(Utah 1986). The focus of this case is on the requirement of medical 
causation, which requires Ms. Brunson to prove that her work at 
Stouffer Foods was the medical cause of her injury. 
Ms. Brunson herself cannot explain why she fainted at work. 
Likewise, her physicians' statements do not reveal any reasonable 
medical certainty regarding the cause of her fainting. In fact, Dr. 
Colver and Dr. Egbert arrive at two different conjectures to explain 
the incident. Under these circumstances, the Commission agrees with 
the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Brunson has failed to establish medical 
causation. 
As noted above, it is Ms. Brunson's burden to prove medical 
causation. Because she has not done so, the Commission must deny her 
claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge and dismisses Ms. Brunson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / / day of February, 1995. 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 days 
of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this 
Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review with 
that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. 
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
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STEVE J. AESCHBACHER 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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P O BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0385 
REVA BRUNSON 
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Adell Butler-Mitchell ^ 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Orders\94-0180 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on day of July 1995, I caused to be 
mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following: 
Steven Aeschbacher, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on day of July 1995, I caused to be 
mailed by First-Class Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion For Review to the following: 
Steven Aeschbacher, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 




Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
5. Illness, Disease: An illness may be considered to be 
the summation of the physical, mental, and other 
kinds of factors that are involved in an individual's 
less than optimal health status. A disease may be 
considered to be the specific pathophysiologic 
processes involved, which give rise to the individual's 
signs and symptoms and their progression.1 
6. Employability: This is the capacity of an individual 
to meet the demands of a job and the conditions of 
employment associated with that job as defined by an 
employer, with or without accommodation. 
7. Employability Determination: This is an assessment 
by management of the individual's capacity, with or 
without accommodation, to meet the demands of a 
job and the conditions of employment. The manage-
ment carries out an assessment of performance capa-
bility to estimate the likelihood of performance failure 
and the likelihood of incurring liability in case of 
human failure. If either likelihood is too great, then 
the employer may not consider the individual employ-
able in the job. 
8. Medical Determination Related to Employability: This 
is the process of evaluating the relationship of an 
individual's health to the demands of a specific job 
as described by the employer, such as demands for 
performance, reliability, integrity, endurance, or 
prolonged service. The physician must ensure that 
the medical evaluation is complete and detailed 
enough to draw valid conclusions with respect to the 
individual's capability of meeting the job's demands 
and carrying out essential job functions. 
The physician's tasks are to (1) identify 
impairments that could affect performance and deter-
mine whether or not the impairments are perma-
nent; and (2) identify impairments that could lead 
to sudden or gradual incapacitation, further impair-
ment, injury, transmission of a communicable dis-
ease, or other adverse occurrence. 
In estimating the risk factors, the physician should 
indicate whether or not the individual represents a 
greater risk to the employer than someone without 
the same medical condition and should indicate the 
limits of the physician's ability to predict the likeli-
hood of an untoward occurrence. 
9. Risk, Hazard: A risk represents the probability of an 
adverse event; a risk must be weighed together with 
the consequences of the adverse event. An individ-
ual's activities or characteristics, and biologic, physical, 
or chemical factors, may increase the risk of morbid-
ity or mortality. 
A hazard is a potential source of danger; to a 
woman contemplating crossing the Atlantic Ocean 
in a rowboat, the Atlantic presents a serious hazard. 
Excessive numbers of coliform bacteria or Shigella 
dysentenaem the public water supply present a hazard 
to a city. 
10. Possibility, Probability: These are terms that refer 
to the likelihood or chance that an injury or illness 
was caused or aggravated by a particular factor. 
"Possibility" sometimes is used to imply a likelihood 
of less than 50%; "probability" sometimes is used 
to imply a likelihood of greater than 50%. 
Social Security Disability Determinat ions 
Although the Social Security system predated the 
first Guides edition and is not based on the Guides, a 
description of the system is included here to compare 
and contrast the ways in which medical information 
is used under each approach.The Social Security 
Administration (SSA) has national responsibility 
under Public Law 74-271 for the administration of 
both the Social Security disability insurance program 
(title II) and the supplemental security income (SSI) 
program (title XVI). Every person who pays into 
Social Security contributes to the Social Security 
Disability Trust Fund. 
The title II program provides cash benefits to 
disabled workers and their dependents who have 
contributed to the trust fund through the FICA tax 
on their earnings. A person qualifies under the title 
II program because of financial need. The title XVI 
program provides for a minimum income for the 
needy, aged, blind, and disabled. Under that pro-
gram, financial need is indicated by limitation of 
income and resources to a level that is equal to or less 
than an amount specified in the law. 
Definitions and Terms 
Under the title II and title XVI programs, the defini-
tions of disability are essentially the same. The law 
defines disability as "the inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment that 
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or 
can be expected to last for a continuous period of 
not less than 12 months (Section 223 [d] [1] [A]). 
The law may apply to infants and children as well as 
adults. In terms of the law, a person is either disabled 
or not disabled. 
To meet the definition of disability, an individ-
ual's impairment or combination of impairments must 
be of such severity that he or she not only is unable 
to do the work previously done, but also cannot per-
form any other kind of substantial gainful work con-
sidering the individual's age, education, and work 
experience (Section 223 [d] [2] [A]). Substantial 
gainful work means any work that involves significant 
and productive physical or mental activities and is 
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